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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all parties to the
proceedings in the district court.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals several discovery rulings and a ruling on attorney's fees in this
case resulting from a final jury verdict. This Court has jurisdiction under URAP Rule 4.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL
Issue. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's Motion To
Compel Discovery and Motions to Extend Discovery?
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals should review this issue under an
abuse of discretion standard of review.
Citation to Record of Issue Preservation. Trial Record (TR) 85-107, 166-167, 290291.
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL
Issue. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to the
Plaintiff as the prevailing party in the lawsuit; and if not, were the fees properly charged
and allocated?
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals should review this issue under an
abuse of discretion standard of review.
Citation to Record of Issue Preservation. TR 644-711.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
There are no such citations of central importance to the appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises from a construction and roofing contract. The Plaintiff contracted
to provide a roof to the Defendant. Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff constructed the
roof improperly and also during construction committed various civil torts. During the
course of the litigation Defendant sought to recuse the Trial Judge. The Defendant's
counsel had several cases with the Judge Lindberg and believed that she could not
impartially rule upon any matters in which he was the counsel. He therefore sought her
recusal prior to advancing the litigation. He was eventually successful in doing so.
However, prior to her recusal, she denied Defendant's Motion to Compel and
invited Defendant to redraft discovery after the discovery deadline had passed. Plaintiff
therefor refused to engage in further discovery. These procedural actions, along with
settlement negotiations and Plaintiffs untimely production of discovery, caused
considerable delay and Defendant was unable to prepare for trial and sought to extend
discovery. The request was denied and the matter went to trial. The jury returned a
verdict of $4200 for Defendant and approximately $31,000 for Plaintiff. Thereafter,
without requiring the allocation of fees, and without scrutinizing double billed fees, and
eliminating fees for unnecessary legal work, the Trial Court granted Plaintiff all
attorney's fees requested.
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The matter commenced on April 19, 2002 when Plaintiff filed and served its
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complaint. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. Soon thereafter
the parties engaged in settlement discussions, discovery, and Defendant sought to recuse
the Trial Judge. The Trial Judge recused herself in July of 2003 and a new Trial Judge
was assigned. The matter went to trial on December 11, 2003 and resulted in a mixed
jury verdict for both parties. Attorney's fees were then awarded Plaintiff and this appeal
ensued.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
1.

On April 19, 2002, Plaintiff commenced this action alleging Breach of

Contract and Unjust Enrichment. He alleged that Defendant had agreed to pay "for
materials and services," owed "$25,906, plus, as provided in the Contract, a 10%
surcharge," and 18% interest. The dispute arose out of a roofing project that Plaintiff
contracted to complete. Trial Record (TR) 1-4.
2.

Defendant/appellant counterclaimed alleging Material Breach of Contract,

Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, Trespass and Conversion.
Defendant alleged that Plaintiff and its agents failed to perform their work in a competent
manner, caused damage, interfered with its parking area, failed to properly hire, train and
supervise its employees who caused waste, damage and privacy violations. TR 14-17.
3.

During the course of this litigation through the day of trial, the Plaintiff

disputed all causes of action asserted by Defendant including the assertion that he had
caused damage to Defendant's air-conditioning units. The sole exception was that at trial,
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Plaintiff conceded it had damaged Defendant's air conditioning units. TR 18-20.
4.

On August 26, 2002, Defendant sent a discovery request to Plaintiff TR

72-73. In this discovery request, in addition to other information, Defendant requested
the following:
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Provide the last known names and numbers
of any business entities, governmental agencies, persons who have ever had any
complaints, concerns, lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues regarding any of the
supplies, workmanship, or services provided by Plaintiff or its agents to any
persons or businesses or other legal entities.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Provide the party names, the name of the court
and docket numbers of lawsuits or administrative actions filed against Plaintiff or
its agents because of any of its business practices or because of its services,
materials or workmanship.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Has Plaintiff or its agents ever been convicted
of any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty?
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: If your answer to the preceding interrogatory
is "yes," please provide the following:
a. The charge,
b. The court;
c. The docket number of the case.
REQUEST NO, 5: Please produce a copy of each and every document
stating the amount that Plaintiff charged Defendant for the work performed,
including but not limited to bills, invoices, and other similar documents.
REQUEST NO.6: Please produce a copy of each of the personnel files,
wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either employees or
independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to
Defendant.
PiEOUESTNO. 12: Please produce a copy of each and every document,
recording, photograph, or other item evidencing any complaints, concerns,
lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues regarding any of the supplies, workmanship, or
services provided by Plaintiff or its agents to any persons or businesses or other
legal entities. TR 86-87

4

5.

Except for Request (for Documents) 5, Plaintiffs response, sent four and a

half months late (TR 84), to all of these discovery requests above was:
Plaintiff objects to this [interrogatory or request] as being vague, ambiguous, over
broad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and beyond the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule because it requests information that is not relevant to the subject
matter of the pending litigation and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence at trial. TR 99-107.
6.

Pursuant to the Trial Court's Scheduling Order, the discovery deadline was

January 30, 2003 (TR 30). No additional discovery, except on expert witnesses could go
forward without an extension of the discovery deadline.
7.

On February 3, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel discovery. TR

8.

The Trial Judge, on March 31, 2003 denied Defendant's Motion to Compel

85-91.

stating:

12. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that [Interrogatory No.2], as presently
structured, is vague and overbroad. It is possible, however, that Defendant may be
able to narrow and define this discovery request by using time limits and language
that limits the information requested to that reasonably calculated to lead to
admissible evidence under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b).
14. The Court again agrees with Plaintiff that [Interrogatory No.3] is vague and
overbroad. Arguably, this particular request could be narrowed by providing
reasonable time limits to the request and limiting the request to causes of action
that relate to the claims Defendant has made against Plaintiff.
16. In support of its [Interrogatory No. 4 and 5] Defendant argues that information
regarding a witness' honesty is always relevant for establishing credibility.
Nevertheless, this discovery request is not limited to those who may be called as
5

witnesses, but appears to apply to any employee of Plaintiff. See Utah R. Evid.
609. Upon identification of those persons who are likely to appear as witnesses at
trial, Defendant might be able to provide a narrower construction of this discovery
request.
19. In Request No.6, Defendant asks Plaintiff to "produce a copy of each of the
personnel files, wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either
employees or independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or
materials to Defendant." Defendant asserts, without support, that this information
is necessary for it to maintain its counterclaims. While some of these documents
arguably may be relevant, as it is currently drafted, the request is over broad.
21. [Request No. 12], appears to be substantively related to Interrogatory No.2. As
the Court has already concluded with respect to the prior request, see supra ffi|1012, this request is also vague. Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or
entity that has ever had a "concern" or "problem" against it. Additionally, the scope
of this discovery request appears to encompass situations not related to
Defendant's claims for negligent employment or material breach of contract.
(Exhibit A and TR 162-163).
9.

Due to Plaintiffs delay in submitting discovery, settlement discussions and

the trial Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel, on April 24, 2003 Defendant requested
an extension of the Discovery cut off deadlines that had passed. TR 166-167.
10.

On May 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. TR

11.

Again, due to Plaintiffs delay in submitting discovery, settlement

223.

discussions the trial Court's ruling on the Motion to Compel, the recusal Motions to
recuse the Trial Judge, and because of an intent to submit a modified discovery request
pursuant to the Trial Judge's denial of its Motion to Compel, on May 7, 2003, Defendant
renewed its request for an extension of the Discovery cut off deadlines that had passed,
requested oral argument thereon, and submitted to Plaintiff the discovery questions it
sought to have the Plaintiff respond to. TR 290-291,

6

12. On April 14, 2003, Plaintiff refused to respond to discovery or submit to a
deposition because the discovery cut off deadline had passed. TR 447 ^ 7, 543 ^ 5.
13.

On May 15, 2003, Defendant objected to the certificate of readiness for trial

and requested oral argument. TR 295.
14.

On May 29, 2003, Defendant notified the court by affidavit that all but one

address given by Plaintiff in his discovery responses regarding potential witnesses were
incorrect or no longer valid. TR 299-300.
15.

On July 3, 2003, Judge Denise Lindberg recused herself from the case. TR

16.

On August 6, 2003, the case was assigned to Judge Timothy R. Hanson.

306

TR308.
17.

On August 28, 2003, the Trial Judge, by telephone conference, without

requiring a written motion, granted Plaintiff the right to make an untimely response to
Defendant's requests for an extension of discovery and set another telephone conference
to address and decide the matter on October 7, 2003. TR 315, 447 If 8, 543 ^ 6.
18.

However, on October 6, 2003, one day prior to the scheduled telephone

conference for oral argument, the Trial Judge issued an order denying Defendant's
request stating:
. . . The court notes that the Defendant requests a hearing on this Request
for Extension. However, since the Request... is not a dispositive motion and
since the parties' written submissions adequately represent their respective legal
positions, the Court declines to schedule this matter for hearing. Therefore,... the
Court rules as stated herein.
The Defendant seeks to extend the January 30, 2002 (sic-2003), discovery
deadline on the basis that discovery in this matter has been delayed by settlement
7

negotiations, the filing of recusal requests and the filing of Motion to Compel. Of
these, only the pendency of a motion to compel could have potentially hindered
discovery from progressing. However, while the Motion to Compel was decided
on March 31, 2003, the Defendant (for unknown reasons) has taken no further
steps to complete its discovery in the months following. Furthermore, as the
Plaintiff accurately describes in his opposition, this case has already been unduly
delayed and the Defendant had not articulated an adequate basis to delay it further.
Accordingly, having considered the Defendant's Request, the Court denies the
same. Exhibit B--TR 325-326, 347-348.
19.

Although they were requested in discovery, Plaintiff conceded during the

trial that he had failed to provide, in response to discovery, any invoices pertinent to the
project. TR 753^4.
20.

On December 11, 2003, Defendant's causes of action for Material Breach

of Contract, Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, Trespass and
Conversion were submitted to the Jury. TR 573.
21.

The Jury returned a General Verdict in favor of Defendant for $4,200 and

returned another General Verdict for Plaintiff for $31,865. TR 610-611.
22.

As a result of this verdict Plaintiff by affidavit requested an award of

attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $20,329. TR 615-625
23.

Defendant submitted a counter affidavit for attorney's fees, contesting

Plaintiffs affidavit of attorney's fees as excessive, and asserting that Defendant was the
prevailing party. Defendant further argued that, besides not properly allocating fees
between claims, requested fees were: (1) double billed, (2) billed for consultation among
attorneys, (3) billed for time spent unsuccessfully defending against Defendant's
counterclaims, (4) and billed for matters that Plaintiff did not pursue, withdrew or was
unsuccessful in pursuing. TR 644-659, 667-670.

8

24.

Among others, Defendant specifically challenged the following entries on

Plaintiffs bill for attorney's fees. TR 661-665.
A. Double billing and attorney consultations between attorneys Sorensen
(RLS), Greg Hawkins (GPH) and Lonn Litchfield (LL) are found at entry
numbers: 3-9, 14, 18, 27, and 33.
B. Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment are not complex. To
research and draft the complaint, Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total of 7.2 hours at
entries 4-7. This time is excessive.
C. To research and draft an answer and reply to Defendant's counterclaim,
Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total of 8.6 hours at entries 8-12. This time is
excessive.
D. Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged Defendant's motion to recuse Judge
Lindberg, Plaintiffs attorneys billed at total of 12.8 hours at entries 25-29.
Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time for a Motion to Dismiss that was never filed by
Plaintiff and prepared documentation for settlement of the case. No such
documents were ever agreed upon by the parties. These are at entries 8, 35.
E. Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time in its unsuccessful challenge to strike
Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery at entries 43-44, 48. Plaintiffs Motion
to Strike was frivolous. Plaintiffs attorney asserted that Defendant had not
consulted with him prior to filing its Motion to Compel. Plaintiffs attorney's own
billing entries demonstrate that such correspondence in fact occurred. After
presenting proof thereof, Judge Lindberg found this claim to be unfounded and
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denied the Motion to Strike.
F. In this matter Defendant's attorney's staff contacted Judge Lindberg's
clerk to determine whether or not a proper jury demand and fee had been paid.
They were informed that it had not. Therefore Mr. Lambert filed a Rule 39 (b)
request for a jury. Rather than simply inform Mr. Lambert of its jury request and
payment, the opposing attorney prepared an objection to the request and billed for
this objection at entry 51. This was completely unnecessary.
G. Plaintiffs attorneys double billed for time spent drafting a Rule 11 letter
to Mr. Lambert threatening him with sanctions that were never imposed at entries
53-54.
H. Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time for preparing, on the eve of trial,
several motions, including a Motion to Strike and Motion for Order to Preclude
New Evidence at entries 61, 64-65. These Motions were frivolous and were
withdrawn by Plaintiff after Defendant had spent considerable time responding to
them and filing counter motions demonstrating their lack of foundation.
25.

The Trial Judge, without engaging in any factual or legal analysis, ruled

Defendant's objection to attorney's fees stating, among other conclusory findings,

. . . Under the case law recited in the Defendant's brief, it is undoubtable that the
Plaintiff prevailed on the significant issues in this litigation and that the
Defendant's success (both in terms of monetary recovery and legal issues
presented) was nominal.
. . . Having reviewed these specific entries, the Court concludes that the
Defendant's objections are without merit and that a reduction in the fees is
unwarranted. In fact, a number of the Defendant's objections are based on the

invalid argument that simply because a particular motion or legal endeavor
pursued by the Plaintiff was eventually unsuccessful, there should be no recovery
for the time attributable thereto. However, it is the overall outcome that is
determinative of prevailing party status and attorney fee recovery and not the
success of each individual motion or legal effort. TR 772-773.
26.

The facts supporting the Trial Judge granting of attorney's fees are that

Plaintiff was awarded all of his requested contractual damages plus interest and a 10%
penalty minus the $4,200 awarded the Defendant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court abused its discretion by failing to compel Plaintiff to answer
discovery requests that were reasonably calculated to lead to evidence about Plaintiff and
his potential witnesses' credibility, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, competency, work customs, and job performance. The requested discovery
was reasonably calculated to lead to the whereabouts of Plaintiff s employees that worked
on Defendant's roof on behalf of Plaintiff.
The Trial Judge denied Defendant's Motion to Compel on March 31, 2003 after
the discovery cut off deadline had passed, but invited Defendant to redraft its requests to
conform to its ruling. The Plaintiff however, refused to engage in further discovery
because of the lapse of the discovery deadline. Defendant then moved to extend
discovery. A Trial Judge abused his discretion when he denied the request stating that the
Defendant had no excuse for not having completed discovery after March 31, 2003.
Rushed into trial, the Defendant was awarded a $4,200 general jury verdict which
offset the Plaintiffs general jury verdict of $31,000. Plaintiffs contract allowed an
award of attorney's fees if he had to pursue collection efforts. The Trial Judge awarded
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Plaintiff his attorney's fees but failed to make any analysis of his decision except that the
monetary award to Defendant was nominal. Defendant asserts that the Trial Judge did not
analyze the contractual language, the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.,
brought by the parties, the importance of the claims relative to each other and their
significance in the context of the lawsuit. Had he done so and juxtaposed these factors
against the factor he gave the most importance to-that being the dollar amounts awarded
to the parties-he may have realized that the Defendant should have been deemed the
prevailing party.
Alternatively, no fees and costs should have been awarded to either side, or
Plaintiff attorneys' fees should have been substantially reduced. Plaintiff did not allocate
fees between claims for which there was no entitlement to attorney fees and for claims for
which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees for time expended on each. Moreover,
the fees billed were a result of inefficiency and an excessive, unreasonable number of
hours spent on the case and for redundant and unnecessary work. This is evidenced by
many frivolous, withdrawn, unsuccessful, non-meritorious motions filed by Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs attorney also requested payment for expenses that were duplicated due to
several attorneys being involved in the same matter.
Lastly, Plaintiffs attorney increased the expense of the litigation by delaying for
trial Plaintiffs concession that he had damaged Defendant's air cooling units. Plaintiff
made an untimely disclosure of a few invoices at trial for materials allegedly integrated
into the roof when they had been requested in discovery. These actions were in bad faith
and in violation with the Civil Rules of Procedure.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO EXTEND DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO COMPEL?
Discovery is allowed so long as the requested discovery, "appears reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." URCP Rule 26(b)(1). The
key is not that something may ultimately be inadmissible or that the discovery net that is
cast is "unduly broad" because it may capture inadmissible or irrelevant information.
Also, there is no per se rule that requires a litigant to so narrowly craft its requests that
only relevant, admissible evidence is produced. Nor must the litigant allow the
opposing/responding party to decide and dictate what is or is not relevant before it
responds to discovery.
Moreover, it is axiomatic that a potential witness' credibility is always a relevant
issue of inquiry in discovery. State v. Lanier, 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989). It is also true that
while character evidence is generally inadmissible, prior bad acts "may, however, be
admissible" to show, "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." URE Rule 404(b). In other words evidence
offered under URE Rule 404(b) "is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose
and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403."
In this case Defendant had alleged that Plaintiff had failed to perform under its
contract with Defendant and that he had negligently hired, trained and supervised his
employees. Defendant more specifically alleged that the Plaintiff and his employees
provided shoddy workmanship, substandard materials and caused both negligent and
13

intentional damage to the Creekside premises and its property. Defendant further alleged
that Plaintiffs employees exposed themselves to Creekside habitants, urinated in full
view of Creekside residents, and soiled the premises. These actions resulted in waste,
destruction of property, nuisance and an invasion of privacy. The jury in fact awarded
Defendant $4,200 for these causes of action.
Given these allegations, all discovery requests were proper that were reasonably
calculated to net information or locate witnesses that could demonstrate that Plaintiff
knew and in fact had negligently hired, trained and supervised his employees, had
provided shoddy, incompetent workmanship, substandard materials, had caused both
negligent and intentional damage to the Creekside premises and its property, or had
violated the Defendant's privacy. Furthermore, all discovery requests were proper that
were reasonably calculated to net information that impeached Plaintiff, its employees and
potential witnesses' credibility.
Defendant's Interrogatories #2 and #3 and Request (for Documents) #12 sought
information that was reasonably calculated to locate other persons or entities that had had
similar complaints or legal actions as those of Defendant against any Plaintiff regarding
its supplies, workmanship, or services. In its Motion to Compel, Defendant indicated that
it had heard rumors that other customers of Plaintiff had encountered the same problems
it alleged against the Plaintiff: i.e., poor workmanship, hiring unskilled workers, using
substandard materials and not complying with his contractual obligations. This comment
was made not as evidentiary proof thereof, but to explain why it had propounded these
discovery requests and to show what it hoped to discover.
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Apparently, the Trial Judge believed that before evidence can be requested in
discovery a litigant must first prove the evidence exists. (See Judge's note at TR 126,
"based on what"). This is not the law.
As argued in its Motion to Compel, Plaintiff through his pleadings and at trial
represented himself as an honest, skilled, highly-qualified professional roofer who used
good workmanship, skilled workers, and appropriate materials. The information sought
may have revealed that Plaintiff or his employees had, on prior occasions, engaged in
tortious acts. Such reports or information may have been admissible to show "proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident," and to show that Defendant knew or should have known his employees were
unskilled and committing torts on the premises of customers and that his roofs were being
installed in a faulty manner with substandard materials, or to attack his credibility and that
of his witnesses. If Plaintiff in fact knew or should have known that his employees had
engaged in such acts prior to working on Defendant's roof, it would have proven that he
should have fired them or trained and supervised them better and since he did not, he was
liable for their actions-even for their intentional torts.
At trial, both Plaintiff and an expert witness testified about the workmanship and
actions of his employees in installing the roof. If Defendant had discovered information
that demonstrated him and his employees were not competent, honest or skillful, this
information could have been used to rebut any of Plaintiff s assertions and to attack his
credibility and his witnesses' credibility. Not only was such evidence directly relevant to
the issue of negligence, URE Rule 406 specifically allows evidence of a habit or routine
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practice to establish Plaintiff acted in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
In denying its Motion to Compel on this request, the Trial Judge stated:
. . . [Interrogatory No.2], as presently structured, is vague and overbroad. It is
possible, however, that Defendant may be able to narrow and define this discovery
request by using time limits and language that limits the information requested to
that reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence under Utah Rules of
Evidence 404(b).
. . . [Request No. 12], appears to be substantively related to Interrogatory No.2.. ..
this request is also vague. Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or entity
that has ever had a "concern" or "problem" against it. Additionally, the scope of
this discovery request appears to encompass situations not related to Defendant's
claims for negligent employment or material breach of contract.
Contrarily, especially in this case's circumstances, obtaining discovery should not
become a guessing game about what a Trial Court judge, or opposing party, would deem
as proper limiting language as to time and subject so that the request is not unduly
burdensome and would only lead to relevant information. Moreover, the discovery
deadline had past on January 30, 2003 (TR 30) and Plaintiff therefor refused to permit
additional discovery. TR 325-326, 347-348; 447 If 7, 543 f 5. Consequently, Defendant
could not redraft and resubmit its discovery requests without the Trial Court's permission
which was refused. Even despite this, Interrogatories #2 and #3 and Request (for
Documents) #12 were limited by time and subject because they sought only information
known by Plaintiff and its agents about prior problems with workmanship and materials.
If a Trial Court judge will not extend discovery in such situations to allow a
litigant to redraft its requests, then at least the Trial Court should provide the limiting
language it deems appropriate. This procedure is contemplated by the rules but is rarely
used. URCP Rule 26 (c) states:

16

"Upon motion by a party . . . from whom discovery is sought... the court.. .may
make any order which justice requires . .. including: . . . (c)(2) that the discovery
may be had only on specified terms and conditions,... (c)(4) that certain matters
not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain
matters;..."
Furthermore, even if discovery had been extended, without the Trial Court's
guidance the parties may have engaged in another round of discovery requests, late
answers and then Motions to Compel. In short, a litigant should not be left to guess what
a particular Trial Judge would deem as acceptable, especially when the discovery
deadlines have passed and the court is unwilling to extend the deadlines.
The Trial Judge also ruled that the discovery requests were overbroad because,
"Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or entity that has ever had a 'concern' or
'problem' against it." Of course, the Plaintiff could not divulge "concerns" or
"problems" he was unaware of, but could and should have divulged those he was aware
of in his answers. It is axiomatic that a litigant can only respond to discovery with
information it knows or is within its possession and control.
In fact, "Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully, in writing
under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the objecting party shall state the
reasons for the objection and shall answer to the extent the interrogatory is not
objectionable. URCP Rule 33 (b)(1).
Further justifying her decision, the Trial Judge stated that: "the scope of this
discovery request appears to encompass situations not related to Defendant's claims for
negligent employment or material breach of contract." Contrarily, the test is not whether
the discovery net may entrap or "encompass" information that is not relevant to a party's
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claims or defenses, but whether it is reasonably calculated to entrap or "encompass"
evidence that may be relevant The Defendant's discovery net was thrown to do just
that, entrap or "encompass" evidence that may be relevant. Until these requests were
answered, it was impossible to address whether or not the information that would have
been obtained was relevant and admissible to parties' defenses and causes of action.
Defendant's Interrogatories #4 and #5 requested whether Plaintiff or its agents had
ever been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty and sought the
details thereon. This information was directly relevant to whether or not Plaintiff
negligently hired or retained any employee and to his and his employees' credibility.
URE Rules 608 & 609 allow a witness' truthfulness to be attacked by any conviction for a
crime, that is punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, or that involves
dishonesty or false statements. URE Rule (609)(a)(b).
In denying Defendant's request for this information, the Trial Judge stated:
. . . [T]his discovery request is not limited to those who may be called as witnesses,
but appears to apply to any employee of Plaintiff. See Utah R. Evid. 609. Upon
identification of those persons who are likely to appear as witnesses at trial,
Defendant might be able to provide a narrower construction of this discovery
request.
The Trial Judge's ruling is impracticable for several reasons. First, at the onset of
litigation and discovery, it was not known by Defendant whom the Plaintiff would call as
witnesses, nor even who the Defendant may have called as a result of its discovery
investigation. As is the norm, the scheduling order in this case required Plaintiff to
identify his witnesses after discovery had closed within 14 days prior to trial. (TR 30,
31). Since Defendant could not engage in discovery after discovery had closed, it could
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not limit its discovery request to only "witnesses." However, as URCP Rule 26 requires,
it could draft its request in a manner reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence. It
did so by limiting its request to "Plaintiff or its agents."
Second, practically speaking it would have been very simple for the Plaintiff to
have indicated if he, his business as an entity or his employees had ever been convicted of
a felony or a crime of dishonesty. Hence the limitation to just the Plaintiff and his
employees was sufficiently detailed and restricted as to not be unduly vague, overbroad or
burdensome. Then, in the event any were called as a witness (as Plaintiff was), the
information would have already been obtained and verified.
Third, this information was relevant to Defendant's claim of negligent employment
regardless of whether or not the Plaintiff or his employees were "witnesses." If Plaintiff
knew, for instance that an employee had been convicted of a felony for lewdness, the jury
may have concluded that he should have supervised or terminated the employee before he
exposed himself to Defendant's unit owners.
Fourth, had discovery been extended to allow Defendant to locate and interview or
depose Plaintiffs employees, knowing that these employees had a criminal conviction
would have allowed defendant to evaluate the employee's credibility which is relevant to
Defendant in calling such a person as a witness.
Defendant's Request (for Documents) #6 asked Plaintiff to produce copies of the
"personnel files, wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either employees or
independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to
Defendant." Such evidence would have allowed Defendant to explore many factual
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issues directly relevant to the case.
First, personnel records contain contact location information on the particular
employee, often including alternative addresses of friends, family and prior employers so
that if the employee had moved they could be located through these other sources. Such
information also allows a litigant to verify if the opposing party has been honest and
thorough in providing last know addresses and phone numbers. In this case, although
Plaintiff provided the last known addresses and phone numbers of his employees,
Defendant was only able to locate one of them and could not verify the thoroughness nor
truthfulness of Plaintiff s information which appeared to be highly suspect.
Second, personnel files, wage statements and contracts could have established
when and how long each employee or agent actually spent working on the Defendant's
roofing project to rebut or validate allegations of adequate staffing and actual work
performed or to rebut the witnesses' testimony about their presence or lack of presence on
the job site. This information may have also reflected upon the credibility of any
witnesses. For instance if any employee witness, including the Plaintiff, claimed to have
had knowledge that work on a certain day was done properly, yet his time card or other
records indicated he wasn't there, this would be relevant. Also, any wages paid were
relevant to Plaintiffs Unjust Enrichment Claim to show Plaintiffs damages or lack
thereof.
Third, personnel records may have had information about the employees skill
levels, qualifications, and other background information such as the Plaintiffs business
practices, habits and routines and whether or not any employee was fired, disciplined, or
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suspended for poor workmanship or committing torts on the job site. This information
was relevant to Defendant's allegation of negligent employment. Moreover, all of
Plaintiffs employees or independent contractors who supplied services or materials to
Defendant were potential witnesses and all information involving their backgrounds may
have been relevant. Such information is routinely requested and should have been
provided in discovery. In re Hawaii Corp., 88 FRD 518, 525 (D. Haw 1998).
Fourth, contracts and wage statements from those who supplied materials to the
project would have allowed Defendant to verify the quality and quantity of the supplies
actually integrated into the roofing project. Such information was reasonably calculated
to lead to relevant evidence about whether the proper materials were integrated into the
roof and what where the costs and quality of the roofing material. This information was
directly relevant to the Plaintiffs claim of Unjust Enrichment and to Defendant's causes
of action for breach of contract. For instance, had Plaintiff been unable to produce proper
invoices for the materials integrated into the roofing project this would have supported
Defendant's claim for breach of contract.
In denying its Motion to Compel on this request, the Trial Judge stated:
. . . Defendant asserts, without support, that this information is necessary for it to
maintain its counterclaims. While some of these documents arguably may be
relevant, as it is currently drafted, the request is over broad.
Contrarily, this request was limited to all persons that were either employees or
independent contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to
Defendant. Hence, it was limited to only those persons working on or supplying
materials integrated into Defendant's roof. This language limited the request to the
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period that the contract was performed. Moreover, if "some of these documents arguably
may be relevant," why wasn't the Plaintiff simply ordered to provide any such documents
with whatever restrictions the Trial Court may have imposed to cure the requests
"overbroadness?" This request was therefore not overbroad.
Plaintiff may claim that since, pursuant to request for documents #5, he provided
some invoices during trial alleged to pertain to Defendant's roof that this negates this
Defendant's arguments hereon. However, at trial there was no way for Defendant to
verify that the invoices actually pertained to materials integrated into Defendant's roof
The invoices that were provided could have been purchases made for other roofing
projects. Had Defendant been permitted to complete discovery, it could have explored
whether or not the invoices pertained to other roofing projects. Consequently, it was error
for the Trial Court's to refuse to compel discovery.
Defendant further contends that the Trial Court's abused its discretion by refusing
to extend discovery. In this case after the initial position pleadings and scheduling order
were provided to the court, on July 9, 2002 Plaintiff sent his discovery request to
Defendant. TR 84. On August 19, 2002, Defendant then filed an informal request that
the Trial Judge recuse herself. TR 58-68. On August 6, 2002, Defendant timely provided
an extensive response to Plaintiffs discovery request. TR 377-421, 494-501.
On Aug. 28, 2002 Defendant provided to Plaintiff its discovery request. TR 72-73.
On Dec. 16, 2002 Defendant's request to recuse Judge Lindberg was sent for a decision
and an Order thereon was signed Jan. 1, 2003. TR 77-78, 79-81. Then on Jan. 24, 2003,
four and a half months late, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's discovery request. TR 84.
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On Feb. 5, 2003 Defendant filed its Motion to Compel. TR 85-107.
On March, 31, 2003, after the discovery cut off deadline the Trial Court ruled upon
the Motion to Compel. TR 160-165. Plaintiff thereafter refused to engage in more
discovery. TR 447 ^ 7, 543 ^ 5. On May 7, 2003 due to Judge Lindberg's continued
conduct, the Defendant again sought to formally recuse Judge Lindberg. On April 25,
2003 and then on May 2, 2003, Defendant moved to extend the discovery deadlines. TR
166-167, 290-291. On July 3, 2003, Judge Lindberg recused herself from the case.
The case was then assigned to Judge Hansen who, in a telephone conference
allowed Plaintiffs to file an untimely response to Defendant's Motions for an Extension
of Discovery and set another telephone conference to address the Motions. One day prior
to the second telephone conference, in a written Minute Entry, the Trial Judge denied the
Motions stating:
. . . The court notes that the Defendant requests a hearing on this request for
Extension. However, since the Request... is not dispositive motion and since the
parties' written submissions adequately represent their respective legal positions,.
.. the Court rules as stated herein. . .
The Defendant seeks to extend the January 30, 2002, (sic-2003) discovery
deadline on the basis that discovery in this matter has been delayed by settlement
negotiations, the filing of recusal requests and the filing of Motion to Compel. Of
these, only the pendency of a motion to compel could have potentially hindered
discovery from progressing. However, while the Motion to Compel was decided
on March 31, 2003, the Defendant (for unknown reasons) has taken no further
steps to complete its discovery in the months following. Furthermore, as the
Plaintiff accurately describes in his opposition, this case has already been unduly
delayed and the Defendant had not articulated an adequate basis to delay it further.
Accordingly, having considered the Defendant's Request, the Court denies the
same. TR 325-326, 347-348.
The Trial Court's denial is an abuse of discretion because it rewarded the
Plaintiffs failure to timely respond to discovery, ignored the obvious bar against
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Defendant to engage in further discovery, and it penalized the Defendant for having
sought and been successful in recusing a fellow District Court Judge and for engaging in
settlement discussions.
First Plaintiff and not Defendant, waited more than four months to respond to
discovery. In its opposition, Plaintiff argued that Defendant was unduly dilatory.
However, even a cursory review of the case history set forth above, demonstrates a
consistent effort to advance the case.
Second, Defendant could not engage in further discovery in the months following
the ruling on the Motion to Compel because the discovery deadline had passed and
Plaintiff refused to engage in further discovery. Also, in her ruling on the Motion to
Compel, the Trial Judge invited Defendant to redraft its requests. Based thereon, what
was Defendant to do to "[take] further steps to complete its discovery in the months
following [March 31, 2003]," hold a gun to Plaintiffs head? No, the only thing it could
do is what it did, file its Motions to Extend in April and then again in May 2003.
Therefore how can Judge Hanson state that there were some "unknown reasons" why
Defendant could complete discovery. He himself stated in his ruling that on "January 30,
2002 (sic-2003)" the "discovery deadline" had expired.
Third, Defendant's successful efforts to recuse Judge Lindberg had indeed delayed
the case. Anecdotally, Defendant's counsel has been warned that even legitimate
concerns raised against a sitting judge could prejudice him with others Judges.
Nevertheless, with all due respect, Defendant's counsel believed that Judge Lindberg
could and would not act impartially and he sought her recusal because he did not want her
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making further decision. Now it appears that Plaintiff and Judge Hansen would opine
that causing this delay in this case to recuse a fellow Judge should in fact be sanctioned as
"undue delay."
Lastly, the Plaintiff and the Trial Judge would penalize as "undue delay" by
Defendant the two months spent in settlement negotiations even though over lapping the
same time Plaintiff delayed his discovery responses by more than four months. Plaintiff
will further argue that Defendant did nothing during settlement negotiations. This is a
curious argument. Plaintiffs counsel billed for preparing settlement documents in
November 2003. (TR 622). Nevertheless, it is reasonable that both parties would not
want to expend more attorney's fees while there was a possibility of a settlement. Hence,
while Defendant's counsel waited to hear back from the Defendant condominium
association on the settlement negotiations, Defendant's counsel tried to resolve the
discovery dispute (TR 699) and in December 2003, when settlement did not occur, he
requested that Plaintiff respond to its discovery. TR 695.
Of further note, although the Trial Judge correctly noted that the administrative
rules do not require oral argument on discovery matters, after allowing Plaintiff the right
to file an untimely response to Defendant's Motions to Extend, he set a telephone
conference to orally address the Motions. Despite this, one day before the telephone
conference, he made his ruling. Perhaps had he allowed the promised argument, defense
counsel could have reminded him that the discovery deadline had passed and thereafter
Plaintiff would not allow further discovery. TR 543-544. Therefore it was not "for
unknown reasons" Defendant had "taken no further steps to complete its discovery in the
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months following," the Trial Court's ruling on March 31, 2003; the case had not been
"unduly delayed;" and the right to complete discovery is "an adequate basis to delay" a
case. Accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to compel discovery
and then in failing to allow Defendant to complete discovery.
Since there has been this error, it is Plaintiffs burden to prove that it was harmless.
In, Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) [overturned on
certiorari on other grounds], the Court of Appeals stated:
However, the usual harmless-error analysis is inapposite where the Trial Court has
erroneously denied a discovery request. In such situations, this court is required to
presume prejudice unless it is shown that the denial was harmless. Prejudice is
presumed because to require the requesting party to show that the error was
harmful would place the requesting party in the untenable position of having to
demonstrate that the contents of inaccessible information would have affected the
outcome of the case. Because the requesting party does not have the information,
he or she will never be able to demonstrate that the Trial Court's erroneous denial
of a discovery request was anything but harmless. The burden of demonstrating
that the erroneous denial of a discovery request was not prejudicial must therefore
rest with the party resisting discovery. (Citations omitted)
II.

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF ITS
ATTORNEY'S FEES?
Plaintiffs contract with Defendant contained a provision stating, "If collection is

made by lawsuit or otherwise, customer agrees to pay interest accrued until paid,
customer also agrees to pay all collection costs, including attorney's fees."

Pursuant to

UCA § 78-27-5, this contractual provision is made reciprocal. Consequently, since both
parties prevailed in this action, the Trial Court had to determine which party prevailed and
then to award it reasonable attorney's fees. Defendant asserts that the Trial Court abused
its discretion in its analysis and award of attorney's fees to the Plaintiff as the prevailing
party.
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Defendant further asserts, even if attorney's fees were properly awarded to the
Plaintiff as the prevailing party, the fees awarded were excessive. Defendant pursued and
prevailed on all of its tort claims. These claims do not allow an award of attorney's fees.
Moreover, Plaintiffs request for fees did not allocate attorney's fees expended in
defending against these claims.
A. Prevailing Party
In this matter, the Plaintiff pursued two causes of action, the first for Breach
Contract, and the second for Unjust Enrichment. The Plaintiff sought a judgment for
$25,906 plus a 10% penalty and an 18% interest charge. The Defendant counterclaimed
for Material Breach of Contract, Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of
Privacy, Trespass and Conversion. As a result of a general verdict form, the jury
rendered a judgment in Defendant's favor on its causes of action for $4,200 and for the
Plaintiff for more than $31,000. So who prevailed?
The prevailing party is not determined solely by size of the monetary award but by
many other factors. In David C. v. Leavitt, 900 F. Supp. 1547 (Ut. Fed. Dist. Ct. 1995),
the Utah Federal District Court, cited as persuasive authority, stated:
Plaintiffs typically are considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees purposes f,fif
they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The
"touchstone" to, and precondition of, prevailing party status is the "'material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.'"
In this case, it is Defendant that obtained the material alteration in the legal
relationship of the parties. This is so because, in essence, the jury determined that
Plaintiff Mr. Stout was not due all the money he requested under his contract when he
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provided his invoice to Defendant because, as concluded by the jury, Defendant was
entitled to an offset against Plaintiffs invoice of $4,200.
In, R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court in
determining who was the prevailing party stated:
.. .[Determining the prevailing party for purposes of awarding fees can oftentimes
be quite simple. Where a Plaintiff sues for money damages, and Plaintiff wins,
Plaintiff is the prevailing party; if Defendant successfully defends and avoids
adverse judgment, Defendant has prevailed. This simple analysis cannot always be
employed, however. . .. [There is] . . . difficulty in determining which party
prevails in complicated cases involving multiple claims and parties, mentioned that
in some circumstances both parties may be considered to have prevailed, and
[there is therefore] the "need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in
particular cases who actually is the 'prevailing party.'ff Which party is the
prevailing party is an appropriate question for the Trial Court. This question
depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is
appropriate to leave this determination to the sound discretion of the Trial Court.
We therefore review the Trial Court's determination as to who was the prevailing
party under an abuse of discretion standard. Appropriate considerations for the
Trial Court would include, but are not limited to, (1) contractual language, (2)
the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the
parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and their
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the
dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various
claims. Based on these and other relevant factors, the Trial Court is in a better
position than we are as an appellate court to decide which party is the prevailing
party. .. . However, the standard articulated above will permit a case-by-case
evaluation by the Trial Court, and flexibility to handle circumstances where both,
or neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed.
(1) Contractual Language.
Plaintiff can request attorney's fees for his Breach of Contract Claim and not for
his Unjust Enrichment claim. Plaintiffs contract stated that, "If collection is made by
lawsuit or otherwise, customer agrees to pay interest accrued . . . [and] all collection
costs, including attorney's fees." At the time Plaintiff presented his invoice for payment,
Defendant disputed the amount because of the causes of action asserted in this lawsuit.
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The Jury agreed with Defendant and granted it a $4,200 offset against the invoice. The
contract only allows an attorney's fee award to Plaintiff for expenses in collections not for
an initial dispute over the contract invoice that is shown to be incorrect by the Defendant.
The attorney fee provision was only operable after this case's judgment was rendered.
(2) The Number of Claims, Counterclaims, Cross-claims, Etc., Brought by the
Parties.
Although Plaintiff was awarded $31,000 under the contract, Defendant prevailed
on its claims for Breach of Contract, Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion
of Privacy, Trespass and Conversion. It can only be argued the Defendant failed to
prevail on its claim for Material Breach of Contract, However, the causes of action for
Negligent Employment, Waste, Nuisance, Invasion of Privacy, Trespass and Conversion
do not allow a party an award for attorney's fees in defending them or prosecuting
them and no attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiff for its unsuccessful
defense of these claims.
(3) The Importance of the Claims Relative to Each Other and Their
Significance in the Context of the Lawsuit Considered as a Whole.
Prosecuting and defending breach of contract claims are not complex-in this case
Plaintiff merely had to introduce the contract, state that the work had been preformed and
indicate what he was still owed thereunder. Defendant's torts and breach of contract
claims were much more complicated. Moreover, Plaintiff admitted at trial that his
misfeasance had damaged the Defendant's air-conditioning units. These units did not
have a market value. This created a difficult evidentiary burden for the Defendant.
Defendant also had a difficult evidentiary burden proving the general damages associated
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with Mr. Stout's tortious behavior. Hence, the damages awarded should not be the
controlling factor to determine the prevailing party. What should be the measure of
success it that Defendant advanced important and significant issues that perhaps by their
moral superiority are a better measure of success? Moreover, the social importance of the
Defendant's counterclaims, when they are considered "relative to each other and their
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole," would indicate that
Defendant was the prevailing party in this action.
(4) The Dollar Amounts Attached to and Awarded in Connection with the
Various Claims.
Plaintiff did receive a larger award than Defendant and therefore this factor alone
is in his favor. In determining who was the prevailing party, the Trial Judge stated:
. . . Under the case law recited in the Defendant's brief, it is undoubtable
that the Plaintiff prevailed on the significant issues in this litigation and that the
Defendant's success (. . . in terms of monetary recovery and legal issues presented)
was nominal... TR 772.
While it is true that "in terms of monetary recovery," Plaintiff appears to prevail, it
is not true that "Defendant's success (both in terms of... legal issues presented) was
nominal." What causes of action or "legal issues presented" did the Defendant not
prevail on? The Trial Court cannot say and in fact engaged in no analysis to indicate
Defendant failed to prevail on all of them or to demonstrate that any other factors other
than the monetary were applied in making its decision. Hence, a more sound decision
would be that it is Defendant who altered the legal position of the parties in this lawsuit
and is therefore the prevailing party. In the alternative, no fees and costs should be
awarded either side, or the amount requested by the Plaintiff for attorneys' fees should be
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reduced substantially.
In Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah 1990) the
Supreme Court stated:
"An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence in the record which
supports the award. However, a Trial Court is not compelled to accept the
self-serving testimony of a party requesting attorney fees even if there is no
opposing testimony/1 A court, when determining what is a reasonable fee, may
reduce the amount requested, after considering factors such as: the difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,... the amount
involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved. (Citations omitted)
Also, as persuasive authority, Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F, Supp. 1544 (Utah
1993), the Utah Federal District court stated:
Before submitting a fee application to the court, the prevailing party must "make a
good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice
ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission."
Another category of time in which reductions are appropriate is unnecessary
duplicative time.. ."If the same task is performed by more than one lawyer,
multiple compensation should be denied." The problem of duplication of hours
is frequently encountered in cases of multiple representation because too many
attorneys (all billing their time) are present at meetings, hearings, and depositions:
"The more lawyers representing a side of the litigation, the greater the
likelihood will be for duplication of services." . .. MIt is often important to
analyze and exclude duplication of time spent on aspects of a case where
several lawyers, paraprofessionals and/or clerks are working simultaneously."
(Citations omitted)
In Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co., 56 P.3d 524 (Utah 2002), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Trial Court had broad discretion in deciding what constitutes reasonable
attorney fees, and we will not reverse that determination absent an abuse of
discretion.
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First, in exercising its discretion in awarding attorney fees, a Trial Court considers
all the evidence and arguments presented regarding the award and in its discretion
determines a reasonable fee. .. [Accepting one party's argument over the other is
not an abuse of discretion in the absence of substantial proof that the Trial Court
abused its discretion. .. [A] Trial Court is not required to adopt the prevailing
party's assertion of what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee.
Second,... the Trial Court can award Prince [in this case a party] attorney fees
only for those issues on which he was the prevailing party. Indeed, we have
explained that a party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its
underlying claims. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees expended
for "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees,
(2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney
fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no
entitlement to attorney fees."
. . . In addition, "while a Trial Court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for
failure to allocate, it may not award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they
have not been allocated as to separate claims and/or parties." In the instant case,
Prince [in this case, Pioneer] was not the prevailing party with respect to whether
the statute required that Bear River pay only necessary claims [was not the
prevailing party with respect to Defendant's counterclaims].. . (Citations omitted.)
Based upon these principles, Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees should be
reduced for the following reasons. First, since Defendant proved its counterclaims, and
since Plaintiff expended considerable time unsuccessfully preparing for and defending
against the Defendant's claims, his requested fees should have been allocated and should
not have been awarded by the Trial Court.
Second, his requested attorney's fees, as set forth in the statement of facts,
included entries for frivolous, withdrawn, and unsuccessful-non-meritorious motions, and
payment for expenses that were duplicated because of several attorneys being involved in
the same matter. Also, Plaintiffs attorneys took an unnecessarily adversarial position in
this case which increased costs.
In determining whether all Plaintiffs attorney's fees billed should be taxed to
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Defendant, the Trial Judge stated:
. . . Having reviewed these specific entries, the Court concludes that the
Defendant's objections are without merit and that a reduction in the fees is
unwarranted. In fact, a number of the Defendant's objections are based on the
invalid argument that simply because a particular motion or legal endeavor
pursued by the Plaintiff was eventually unsuccessful, there should be no recovery
for the time attributable thereto. However, it is the overall outcome that is
determinative of prevailing party status and attorney fee recovery and not the
success of each individual motion or legal effort. TR 772-773.
The ruling oversimplifies Defendant's arguments and the law thereon. Plaintiff
had a duty, "Before submitting a fee application to the court. . make a good-faith effort
to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such
hours from his fee submission." Jane L., supra. In this case, a private lawyer would not
have billed for excessive, frivolous and unwarranted and unduly adversarial actions.
Moreover, a trial court "may reduce the amount requested, after considering factors such
as:.. .the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the
number of hours spent." Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs bills for Motions that were
not filed, were frivolous and were unsuccessful should not be taxed because they were
"unnecessary," demonstrated inefficiency, and the number of hours spent on them were
not reasonable.
Plaintiff unnecessarily double billed: "If the same task is performed by more
than one lawyer, multiple compensation should be denied." Jane L.} supra. Double
billing and attorney consultation between attorneys were found in Plaintiffs bill in entries
3-9, 14, 18, 27, and 33. Plaintiffs attorneys double billed for time spent drafting a Rule
11 letter, at entries 53-54, to Defendant's counsel threatening him with sanctions. No
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such sanctions were ever imposed and the allegations were frivolous.
Plaintiff unnecessarily overcharged: Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment
are not complex. To research and draft the complaint, Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total
of 7.2 hours at entries 4-7. To research and draft an answer and reply to Defendant's
counterclaim, Plaintiffs attorneys billed a total of 8.6 hours at entries 8-12. This time is
excessive.
Plaintiff excessively and unnecessarily billed for frivolous time on issues not even
pursued or allowed by the rules of civil procedure: The rules do not require a responsive
motion to a Motion to Recuse. Nevertheless, Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged
Defendant's motion to recuse Judge Lindberg-billing at total of 12.8 hours at entries 2529-and admitting that it filed its response simply because he felt that as an adversary, he
had to oppose Defendant's Motion to Recuse. TR 669 f 7. Plaintiffs attorneys billed
time for a Motion to Dismiss that was never filed by Plaintiff and prepared
documentation for settlement of the case. No such documents were ever discussed nor
agreed upon by the parties. These are at entries 8, 35. Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time
in its unsuccessful and frivolous challenge to strike Defendant's Motion to Compel
Discovery at entries 43-44, 48. This is so because Plaintiffs attorney asserted that
Defendant had not consulted with him prior to filing its Motion to Compel. Plaintiffs
attorney's own billing entries demonstrate that such correspondence in fact occurred.
After presenting proof thereof, Judge Lindberg found this claim to be unfounded, without
merit and denied the Motion to Strike.
Plaintiffs attorney billed for time unnecessary spent: Judge Lindberg's clerk
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represented to Defendant that a jury fee had not been paid. Therefore Defendant filed a
Rule 39 (b) request for a jury. Rather than simply inform Defendant that it had made
payment, Plaintiffs counsel prepared and billed for an objection to the request at entry
51.
Plaintiffs attorneys billed for time for preparing, on the eve of trial, several
motions, including a Motion to Strike and Motion for Order to Preclude New Evidence at
entries 61, 64-65. These Motions were frivolous and were withdrawn by Plaintiff after
Defendant had spent considerable time responding to them and filing counter motions
demonstrating their complete lack of foundation.
All of these billings should have been scrutinized by the Trial Court. The Trial
Court's ruling thereon demonstrates that he in fact "accept[ed] the self-serving
testimony of a party requesting attorney fees . . . " i n his award. No effort was made to
consider "the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, [and] the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case . . . "
Moreover, since the Defendant pursued and prevailed on its tort claims for which
no attorney's fees could be awarded, "the Trial Court [could award Plaintiff] attorney
fees only for those issues on which he was the prevailing party. Indeed, [Plaintiff in]
seeking fees [should have allocated its fee] . . . [for] the time and fees expended for (1)
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees [and],... (3)
claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Since Plaintiff did not, the
Trial Court should have either denied "fees altogether for failure to allocate," or at least
not awarded "wholesale all attorney fees requested [because] they [had] not been
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allocated.55
Lastly, the Trial Court should have taken into consideration the "inefficient" and
improper actions by Plaintiff that increased the fees and the uncertainty of the litigation.
As stated above, Plaintiff finally conceded at trial that he had damaged Defendant's air
cooling units. Also, Plaintiff provided a few invoices at trial for materials allegedly
integrated into the roof. They should have been provided a year sooner with his discovery
responses. These actions were in bad faith and in violation with the Civil Rules of
Procedure. Timely admissions and responses to discovery would have averted the need of
both parties to address these issues during the litigation thus avoided unnecessary
expenses, or even hastening a settlement of that issue.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is respectfully requested that the Trial Court be found to have
abused its discretion in not compelling discovery, not extending the discovery deadlines
and then in awarding all attorney's fees billed by Plaintiff as the prevailing party.

Dated: £kc-

7 7/ ZOO H•
Arrow Legal Solutions

Attorney for Appellant
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EXHIBIT A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

JOHN F. STOUT d.b.a. PIONEER
ROOFING CO.,
MINUTE ENTRY ON MOTION TO
COMPEL, MOTION TO STRIKE
AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Judge Denise P. Lindlx i ^
Case no. 020404177

Defendant.

T[l
Three motions are before the Court: (1) Defendant's Motion to Compel and Request for
Attorney's Fees, filed February 5,2003; (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to
Compel and Request for Attorney's Fees, filed February 20,2003; and (3) Plaintiffs Motion for
Protective Order. Based upon the Court's review of the parties' memoranda and the law, the
Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Compel, DENIES Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, but
GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
T[2
These motions arise out ot Plaintiffs action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment,
originally filed April 19, 2002. In its Complaint Plaintiff alleged that it contracted with
Defendant to provide roofing services and materials to be used in improving Defendant's
property, and that Defendant failed to pay for these services.
\S
Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaim on May 9, 2002. First, Defendant alleged
that Plaintiff materially breached the contract by failing to perform the work competently and by
causing damage to Defendant's premises. Second, Defendant claims that "Plaintiff failed to
properly hire, train, supervise and discipline its employees." Plaintiff replied to Defendant's
Counterclaim on May 15,2002.
K4
Following an attorneys' planning meeting, Defendant submitted to Plaintiff its First Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in August 2002. On September 13,
1

2002, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant setting forth objections to the discovery requests. These
objections were also set forth in Plaintiffs responses to Defendant's discovery requests.
Although the parties explored settlement options between September and December 2002, the
parties could not come to agreement.
1f5
Thereafter, on February 5, 2003 Defendant filed this Motion to Compel and for Attorneys
Fees. Plaintiff responded by moving to Strike Defendant's motion on the ground that Defendant
had not included a Rule 37(2)(A) certification that it had made a prior good faith attempt to
secure the requested disclosures from Plaintiff. Simultaneously, Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Protective Order, arguing that the Defendant's discovery requests are vague, overbroad, or
unduly burdensome. Defendant filed a "Verified Reply" and requested oral argument on
February 28, 2003.
ANALYSIS
%6

The Rules of Judicial Administration provide,
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any claim
in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the
principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a
written request for a hearing.

Rule 4-501(3)(R) (emphasis added).
X
Defendant did not comply with the clear requirements of Rule 4-501. Defendant did not
include a request for oral argument in its Motion to Compel, "the principal memorandum in
support of" its motion. Rather, Defendant waited until filing its Reply to request oral argument.
Moreover, the rules presume that motions will be addressed without hearing unless, as noted
above, the parties timely file their request for oral argument and the pending motion is one which
could be dispositive of one or more of the claims on the merits with prejudice. Utah R. Jud.
Admin. 4-501(3)(B). Neither of those prerequisites has been met in this case. Thus, the Court
DENIES Defendant's request and makes its determinations on the pending motions based solely
on the documents submitted by the parties.
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike
1[8
In its Motion to Strike Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to include certification
required Rule 37(2)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While it is true that Defendant
failed to include such a certification in its original motion, Defendant has since cured this
problem by providing the certification in its Reply. Because this is the sole ground raised by
Plaintiff in support of its motion, this motion has been rendered moot by subsequent action by
Defendant. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion.
2

iL

Defendant's Motion to Compel *
V.
Defendant argues that its discovery requests are appropriate because they may lead to
admissible evidence regarding the credibility, skill, and knowledge of Plaintiff s employees,
which Defendant alleges is at issue in this case. Defendant has alleged that Plaintiff "provided
shoddy workmanship, substandard materials and actually caused damage to the Creekside
premises and its equipment," as well as that Plaintiffs employees "exposed themselves to
Creekside habitants, urinated in full view of Creekside residents, and soiled the premises." For
the reasons given below, the Court DENIES each of Defendant's discovery requests because they
are vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
Tl'10

In Intenof alorv No. 2, Defendant asks Plaintili to
[p]rovide the last know names and numbers of any business entities, governmental
agencies, persons who have ever had any complaints, concerns, lawsuits, disputes,
problems, issues regarding any of the supplies, workmanship, or services provided
by Plaintiff or its agent to any persons or businesses or other legal matters.

%l 1

Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory, claiming it is
. . . vague, ambiguous, overbroad [sic], unduly burdensome, oppressive, and
beyond the scope of discovery permitted by Rule because it requests information
that is not relevant to the subject matter of the pending litigation and is not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence at trial.

f 12
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this interrogatory, as presently structured, is vague
and overbroad. It is possible, however, that Defendant may be able to narrow and define this
discovery request by using time limits and language that limits the information requested to that
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence under Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b).
T| 13

In Interrogatory IN o * Defendant requests
. . . the party names, the name of the court and docket numbers of lawsuits or
administrative actions filed against Plaintiff or its agents because of any of its
business practice or because of its services, materials or workmanship.

f 14
The Court again agrees with Plaintiff that this interrogatory is vague and overbroad.
Arguably, this particular request could be narrowed by providing reasonable time limits to the
request and limiting the request to causes of action that relate to the claims Defendant has made
against Plaintiff.
1]15

Defendant's Interrogatories Nos 4 and 5 relate to the same issues In Interrogator y No 4,
3

Defendant seeks the following information: "Has Plaintiff or its agents ever been convicted of
any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty?" Interrogatory No. 5 seeks specific
information in the event that Interrogatory No. 4 is answered in the affirmative.
f 16 In support of its request, Defendant argues that information regarding a witness's honesty
is always relevant for establishing credibility. Nevertheless, this discovery request is not limited
to those who may be called as witnesses, but appears to apply to any employee of Plaintiff. See
Utah R. Evid. 609. Upon identification of those persons who are likely to appear as witnesses at
trial, Defendant might be able to provide a narrower construction of this discovery request.
f 17 Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 7 are also related. Interrogatory No. 6 asks, "Do you claim that
Defendant or its agents made any representations that were incorrect?" If Plaintiff answers this
interrogatory in the affirmative, Interrogatory No. 7 requests specific information regarding any
such misrepresentations. These discovery requests are also vague, overbroad, and ambiguous.
Plaintiff has no way of knowing what "any representations" are. Furthermore, particular
representations or misrepresentations do not appear to be an issue in this case.
Tfl8 The Court next turns to Defendant's requests for documents. Defendant asserts that
Plaintiff failed to fulfill Requests Nos. 6, 7, and 12. Plaintiff has made a general objection to
these requests, alleging that they "are over broad [sic], vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome,
and the information is protected by the attorney-client and work-produce privileges."
1(19 In Request No. 6, Defendant asks Plaintiff to "produce a copy of each of the personnel
files, wage statements, contracts of all persons that were either employees or independent
contractors of Plaintiff and who supplied services or materials to Defendant." Defendant asserts,
without support, that this information is necessary for it to maintain its counterclaims. While
some of these documents arguably may be relevant, as it is currently drafted, the request is
overbroad.
K20

Defendant's Request No. 12 asks Plaintiff to
. . . produce a copy of each and every document, recording, photograph, or other
item evidencing any complaints, concerns, lawsuits, disputes, problems, issues
regarding any of the supplies, workmanship, or services provided by Plaintiff or
its agents to any persons or businesses or other legal entities.

f21 This request appears to be substantively related to Interrogatory No. 2. As the Court has
already concluded with respect to the prior request, see supraffif10-12, this request is also
vague. Plaintiff has no way of knowing every person or entity that has ever had a "concern" or
"problem" against it. Additionally, the scope of this discovery request appears to encompass
situations not related to Defendant's claims for negligent employment or material breach of
contract.
4

Plaintiffs Motion tor Protective Order
^22 For the same reasons that the Court has DENIED Defendant's Motions to Compel, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order.
ORDER
II21 The Court DENffiS^laintiff s Motion to Strike, DENIES Defendant's Motion to
Compel, and GRANTS BetSnoatrt^viotion for Protective Order. Because Defendant has not
prevailed in its motion, the Court also DENIES its request for attorney's fees.
So Ordered this 31st day of March, 2003 B\ 11K ( \>uit
/ ^
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EXHIBIT B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AtTO FOR SALT \,hKK BOUNTY, STATU OF UTAH

JOHN F. STOUT, doing business
as PIONEER ROOFING CO.,

M1N1JTK ENTRY

CASE NO.
Plaintiff,

030917317

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

vs.

OCT 1 6 2003

CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Defendant.

Deputy Clerk

The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the
defendant
Discovery.

seeking

a

ruling

on

its

Request

fur

Extensa 01 1 of

The Court notes that the defendant requests a hearing

on this Request for Extension

However, since the Request for

Extension

motion and since the parties1

is not a dispositive

written submissions adequately represent their respective legal
positions, the Court declines to schedule this matter for hearing.
Therefore,

having

ireviewed

the

defendants1

Request

and

the

plaintiff!s opposition thereto, the Court rules as stated herein.
The defendant seeks to extend the January 30, 2002, discovery
deadline on the basis that discovery

in this matter has been

delayed by settlement negotiations, the filing of recusal requests
and the filing of a Motion to Compel.

Of these, only the pendency

of a motion to compel could have potentially hindered discovery

STOUT V. CREEKSIDE
EAST CONDO ASSOC.
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MINUTE ENTRY

from progressing. However, while the Motion to Compel was decided
on March 31, 2003, the defendant (for unknown reasons) has taken no
further steeps to complete its discovery in the months following.
Furthermore,

as

the

plaintiff

accurately

describes

in

his

opposition, this case has already been unduly delayed and the
defendant has not articulated an adequate basis to delay it
further.

Accordingly, having considered the defendants Request,

the Court denies the same.
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the
Court, denying the defendants Request for Extension.

STOUT V. CREEKSIDE
EAST CONDO ASSOC.
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Ml NUT I ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify thai

1 mailed a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this

H> day of October,

2003:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Rick L. Sorensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
45 West 10000 South, Suite 307
Sandy, Utah 84070
Loren M.
Attorney
266 East
Midvale,

Lambert
for Defendant
7200 South
Utah 84047
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EXHIBIT C

JLEB E1STAICT COURT

Third Judic!el District

IM A (n F n

APR - 5 200^
SALT LAKE CQIJK

By

Sy

Deputy Clark

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN F. STOUT, doing business
as PIONEER ROOFING CO.,

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
CASE NO.

030917317

Plaintiff,
vs.

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS

CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

DATE

Defendant.

The Court has before it a Notice to Submit for decision filed
by the plaintiff seeking a ruling on its counsel's Affidavit of
Attorney's Fees, filed on January 12, 2004. The defendant filed a
Request for Extension of Time to Respond to this Affidavit on
January 22, 2004, which the plaintiff opposed. Then, without leave
of

Court, the defendant

filed

an untimely

Response

to the

plaintiff's Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and a Counter Request for
Attorney's Fees.
Affidavit.

These were accompanied by defense counsel's

Despite the untimeliness of the defendant's Response

and Counter Request, the Court determines that in the interest of
justice, both should be considered.

However, the Court declines

the defendant's request for oral argument. The issue of attorney's
fees is not dispositive and, since both sides' written submissions
adequately set forth their respective legal positions, oral
Minute Entry and Order @J

STOUT V. CREEKSIDE
EAST CONDO ASSOC.
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MINUTE ENTRY

argument is neither necessary nor helpful.

Therefore, having

reviewed the Affidavit of Attorney!s Fees filed by plaintiff's
counsel,

the

defendant's

Response

and

Counter

Request,

the

Affidavit of defense counsel and the plaintiff's Reply thereto, the
Court rules as stated herein.
Plaintiff's counsel, Rick L. Sorenson, has submitted his
Affidavit

detailing

the

attorney's

fees

plaintiff incurred, totaling $20,329.00.

and

costs

that

the

In its Response, the

defendant raises a number of alternative arguments for reducing
these

fees, eliminating

them altogether or

defendant its attorney's fees and costs.

for awarding the

With respect to the

latter two arguments, the defendant essentially contends that the
jury's verdict was "factually and legally invalid" and that it
should be considered the prevailing party.
The Court has considered the defendant's theory that it is the
prevailing party and finds it unpersuasive.

Under the case law

recited in the defendant's brief, it is undoubtable that the
plaintiff prevailed on the significant issues in this litigation
and that the defendant's

success

(both in terms of monetary

recovery and legal issues presented) was nominal. Further, unless
and until it is proven that the jury's verdict was improper, this
argument cannot provide a valid basis for reassigning prevailing
party status.

Therefore, the Court remains unconvinced that the

STOUT V. CREEKSIDE
EAST CONDO ASSOC.
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defendant, rather than the plaintiff, can be considered the
prevailing party.
Next, the Court considers the defendant's argument that even
if the plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorney's fees, the
amount sought is unreasonable and excessive.

Specifically, the

defendant assails a number of entries in counsel's Affidavit as
being duplicitous, unnecessary and excessive in terms of time and
effort.

Having

reviewed

these

specific

entries, the Court

concludes that the defendant's objections are without merit and
that a reduction in the fees is unwarranted.

In fact, a number of

the defendant's objections are based on the invalid argument that
simply because a particular

motion or legal endeavor pursued by

the plaintiff was eventually unsuccessful, there should be no
recovery for the time attributable thereto.

However, it is the

overall outcome that is determinative of prevailing party status
and attorney fee recovery and not the success of each individual
motion or legal effort. Further, the Court is unpersuaded that Mr.
Sorensen's hourly fees should be reduced because of his minimal
involvement with jury trials involving construction law.

Mr.

Sorensen's hourly fees are reasonable given his apparent expertise
in construction law and the comparable fees charged by attorney's
with similar practices and years of experience. Overall, the Court
concludes

that

the attorney's

fees and costs

sought by the

STOUT V. CREEKSIDE
EAST CONDO ASSOC.
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MINUTE ENTRY

plaintiff aire reasonable and therefore declines to reduce the
amounts sought by the almost 50% amount suggested by the defendant.
This Minute Entry decision will') stand as the Order of the
Court, awarding the plaintiff attorpiey's fees in the amount of
$20,100 and costs in the amount of/$229.00.

STOUT V. CREEKSIDE
EAST CONDO ASSOC.
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry and Order, to the following, this,
of April, 2004:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Rick L. Sorensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
45 West 10000 South, Suite 309
Sandy, Utah 84070
Loren M.
Attorney
266 East
Midvale,

Lambert
for Defendant
7200 South
Utah 84047
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EXHIBIT D

FILED DISTRICT : " i » ;

Gregory P. Hawkins #4485
Rick L. Sorensen #7631

Third Judicial r •;..:...

HAWKINS & SORENSEN

Centennial Plaza, Suite 309
45 West 10000 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801)233-0031
Facsimile: (801)233-0032
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SALT LAKE COV"

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OP-JUDGMENTS
DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN F. STOUT doing business as
PIONEER ROOFING CO.

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 030917317 DC
CREEKSIDE EAST CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant.

This matter came on for trial before the Court and a Jury, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
District Court Judge, presiding on December 9. 2003, and continued through December 10, 2003,
and December 11,2003. Rick L. Sorensen of Hawkins & Sorensen, LC appeared for and on behalf
of Plaintiff John F. Stout doing business as Pioneer Roofing Co. (hereinafter **Pioneer Roofing").
Loren M. Lambert of Arrow Legal Solutions, LLC appeared for and on behalf of Etefendant
Creckside East Condominium Homeowners Association (hereinafter "Creekside"). The issues were
duly tried and the Jury having duly rendered its verdict,

Judgment &J

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Plaintiff Pioneer Roofing recover from Defendant Creekside $27,665.00, plus interest
thereon at the rate of 18%, as provided in the contract and pursuant to section 15-1 -4(2) of the Utah
Code, from December 12, 2003, and continuing thereafter until paid and, as the prevailing party,
Pioneer Roofing is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $20,100.00 and costs in the amount of
$229,00 to be paid by Defendant Creekside for a total judgment in the amount of $47,994.00. ¥h»
Judgment may be augmented in the amount uf aasunablc coats and attorney^ foes pursuant to Rule .
-y^s&hg Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . - " ^

INFORMATION STATEMENT
Name and Last-Known Address of Judgment Deb torts):
a.

Creekside East Condominium Homeowners Association, 5319 S. 560 E. No. A,
Murray, Utah 84107

Address at Which Judgment Debtorfs) Received Service of Process:
a.

5319 S. 560 E. No. A, Murray, Utah 84107

Name and Address of Judgment Creditor:
a.

John F. Stout, Pioneer Roofing, 7041 South 2700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Amount of Judgment Entered in Registry of Judgments:
Debtor's Social Security Number:
Debtor's Date of Birth:

N/A

N/A

Debtor's Driver's License Number:
Status;

$47,994.00

N/A

No stay of enforcement has been ordered by the Court.
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